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dangers are realized before he can curtail petitioner's rights, the security of the
correctional institution will be jeopardized. The right to freedom of religion,
which is a qualified right at best, is expressly limited by section 610 just to
avoid such a possibility. The dissent stated that "the warden is not required
to supply clergymen of every conceivable denomination or sect under all cir-
cumstances." Obviously, if the selection is found to be contrary to the intent of
section 610, the warden need not allow that clergyman to communicate with
the inmates. However, this statement by the dissent implies that a prisoner
may be denied ministration solely because he is the member of a small de-
nomination. This principle cannot be gleaned from section 610. The Court,
by attempting to determine whether the Commissioner had complied with the
requirements of section 610, has implicitly held that the Black Muslims are
a religious group. However, the interesting question of whether the Commis-
sioner has denied the prisoner his religious freedom will be answered at Special
Term.' 5
Bd.
EMERGENCY RENT CONTROL LA W AMENDMENT OF 1962 UPHELD AS NO DENIAL
OF DUE PROCESS OR EQUAL PROTECTION
After the institution of "most recent years" equalization rates in 1961, the
State Legislature made a complete reversal and reinstated the use of the 1954
equalization rate for computation of six per cent returns on rent-controlled resi-
dential property. Appellants, two landlords and a tenant, brought a direct
appeal questioning the constitutionality of the statute,' specifically section four
of the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law as amended in 1962.2 The
Court held: affirmed, two justices dissenting, that the statute was not an -un-
constitutional denial of due process, as producing a confiscatory result or as an
unreasonable exercise of the police power, nor did it deny landlords or tenants
equal protection of the law. Bucho Holding Co. v. Temporary State Housing
Rent Comm'n, 11 N.Y.2d 469, 184 N.E.2d 569, 230 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1962).
When the Legislature has found an emergency to exist as a condition
precedent, it has the right to institute rent controls in the exercise of its police
power. Once enacted, no "vested interest" exists in the statute entitling a person
to have the rates remain unaltered.3 Rent control statutes enacted to meet
emergencies and not contemplating the taking of property are not an arbitrary
15. Discussion of the Black Muslim problem as it is being treated in the federal,
court system can be found in: Pierce v. La Valle, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961); Sevell
v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961); 60 Mich. L. Rev. 643 (1962); and 75 Harv.
L. Rev. 837 (1962).
1. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 589(4); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5601(b)(2), eff. Sept. 1963.
2. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 8584(4)(a) (McKinney 1962); This provision is not
applicable to New York City since that city has enacted its own rent control law pursuant
to authority granted by the Legislature.
3. In the Matter of the Estate of West, 289 N.Y. 423, 46 N.E.2d 901 (1943).
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use of police power, though they may occasionally result in the operation of
realty at a loss.
4
The first emergency rent control laws were passed in New York in the
1920's. They were re-enacted in 1946, and then in 1950, at which time the
state embarked on a full-scale rent control program. The laws were enacted as
a consequence of a legislative finding that an emergency existed, this emergency
stemming from the recent war and a shortage of dwelling houses.5 These rent
control measures were adopted in order to prevent abnormal increases in rent,
acute shortages in dwelling houses, and serious ill effects upon public health,
safety, and general welfare.6 When revising the statute in issue, which provided
for use of the "most recent year" equalization rate, it was thought the new
rate would be fair and equitable to all concerned. Upon realization of the
unfairness of this measure, however, the Legislature reversed itself and rein-
stituted the 1954 rate.
7
The Court in the instant case upheld the statute as a reasonable exercise
of legislative power. In the opinion, Judge Fuld reiterated the rule that the
state does not have to use a particular "fair return formula," 8 therefore appel-
lants are not denied equal protection of the laws on this ground. The appellants
were equally unsuccessful with their due process contention since they could
not effectively show that this rate was confiscatory, that is, that the instituted
rate was so low as to preclude a reasonable rate of return.9 This legislation was
not an unreasonable exercise of the police power because it bore a "reasonable
relationship" to a legitimate legislative purpose, that purpose being to prevent
the exaction of unreasonable, unjust, and oppressive rents which result in
uncertainty, hardship and dislocation.' 0 When the purpose of legislation of
this nature is to prevent an evil, it is a valid legislative purpose." The Court
found that the return to the 1954 rates was not to promote a political advantage,
as the dissent urged, but rather to prevent oppressive rents. A standard was
reinstituted which had not been discredited, but discarded, since at that time
the Legislature believed that it had found a more reasonable and fair method
of determining profit rates of return. Upon a finding that this was not the case,
4. Teeval Co. v. Stern, 301 N.Y. 346, 93 N.E.2d 884, cert. den., 340 U.S. 876 (1950).
S. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 15 (1962); N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 23 (1961).
6. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 8581.
7. Leg. Docs., supra at note 5. The Commission that proposed the "most recent
year" rate intended that it would be fair to all parties.
8. I.L.F.Y. Co. v. Temporary State Housing Rent Comm'n, 11 N.Y.2d 259, 183
N.E.2d 220, 228 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1962); I.L.F.Y. v. Temporary State Housing Rent
Comm'n, 10 N.Y.2d 263, 176 N.E.2d 822, 219 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1961).
9. In Teeval Co. v. McGoldrick, 304 N.Y. 859, 109 N.E.2d 720 (1952), a four percent
return on residential property was found not to offend against constitutional guarantees
or requirements.
10. Bucho Holding Company v. Temporary State Housing Rent Comm'n, 11 N.Y.2d
469, 184 N.E.2d 569, 230 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1962).
11. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (where during an emergency Congress
passed the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942) ; Block v. Hirch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921)
(where legislation was enacted fixing "reasonable and fair" rents for the District of
Columbia).
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a return to the old standard was proper, if not because it was a good standard,
then because of an absence of a better one. This legislation was presumed to be
constitutional, that is, presumed to be supported by facts known to the Legis-
lature, and "while this presumption is rebuttable, unconstitutionality would
have to be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt.12 This could not be done.
Appellants argued that there was inequality as between landlords and tenants
in the statute. Their argument was that in different assessing units the ratio
between using the 1954 rate and using the "most recent" equalization rate would
not be uniform, and that in some parts of the state landlords would be
receiving large profits while in others they would not be receiving a fair
rate of return. This argument was answered by the Court in two ways: first,
"the fact that the 1954 equalization acts do not reflect the full underassess-
ments in certain areas is unfortunate, but it had to be viewed by the Legislature
in the light of the effect on tenants generally if the revised acts were used,"'1
and second, the precedent of the recent Abroino case which foreshadowed this
decision.
In Four Maples Drive Realty Corp. v. Abromo,14 the Court held that
the mere fact that the particular legislation under consideration did not affect
all areas uniformly does not render it unconstitutional upon equal protection
grounds "since the fact that the legislation does not affect all areas uniformly
may furnish the necessary means of giving equal protection to all persons."
Under these considerations, this court, cognizant of its own obligation toward
legislative enactments, upheld the constitutionality of this statute. Appellants'
arguments, although well conceived, fell short of rebutting the presumption
of constitutionality. The 1954 rate is not the best, but it is as the Court states,
simple, objective, and readily ascertainable, making it therefore practical and
feasible.'5 If a different and perhaps more complicated rate was desired, the
Legislature could have turned to the method used in condemnation or tax
certiorari proceedings, but this was intentionally avoided. It remains for the
Legislature to turn again to this problem, and establish a rate which cannot
be said to be archaic,16 and yet will be reasonable and fair.
B.B.F.
MOTORIST DENIED RIGHT TO COUNSEL PRIOR TO SOBRIETY TEST
A motorist, placed under arrest for driving while intoxicated, was asked
by police to submit to a sobriety test. By provision of the Vehicle and Traffic
Law, refusal to take the test is cause for the administrative revocation of an
12. Wiggins v. Town of Somers, 4 N.Y.2d 215, at 218, 149 N.E.2d 869, at 871, 173
N.Y.S.2d 579, at 582 (1958).
13. Bucho, supra note 10, at 477, 184 N.E.2d at 573, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
14. 2 A.D.2d 753, 153 N.Y.S.2d 747 (2d Dep't 1955); motion for leave to appeal
denied, 2 N.Y.2d 707, 138 N.E.2d 345, 163 N.Y.S.2d xc; appeal dismissed, 2 N.Y.2d 837,
140 N.E.2d 870, 159 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1957), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 14 (1956).
15. Bucho, supra note 10, at 477, 184 N.E.2d at 573, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
16. Bucho, supra note 10, at 479, 184 N.E.2d at 574, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 984.
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